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I. INTRODUCTION 
When the methods of decision-making point in different 
directions, Justice Benjamin Nathan Cardozo tells us that no one 
decision-making “formula” should be followed. “If you ask how 
[the judge] is to know when one interest outweighs the other, I can 
only answer that he must get his knowledge just as the legislator 
gets it, from experience and study and reflection; in brief, from life 
itself.”1 What Justice Cardozo did not explicitly say, however, is 
                                                                                                             
 ∗  J.D., Paul M. Hébert Law Center, Louisiana State University (2015). 
This note was written prior to the judgment delivered on June 26, 2015, by the 
U.S. Supreme Court in Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015), ruling that 
the fundamental right to marry is guaranteed to same-sex couples by both the 
Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
 1. Benjamin N. Cardozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 112-113 
(1921).  
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that beyond experience, study, and reflection reside empathy and 
compassion. In formulating judgments, the court’s angle of vision 
makes all the difference.  
The law is rooted in the ethical treatment of persons, and the 
underlying basis of ethics is empathy.2 In the absence of empathy 
the law is merely a tool for rationalization, and fails to act as an 
instrument for social justice. There is, however, a widely held—but 
fallacious—belief in the “purely objective ruling.” 
Incontrovertibly, each decision implicitly reflects the bias that each 
judge carries. Such bias expresses itself as the inclination to give 
the “benefit of the doubt” to those with whom they identify and to 
be skeptical of those with whom they share little mutuality. 
Nevertheless, while judges’ decisions must be in accord with the 
Constitution, it is essential that they have a sense of empathy such 
that the law may accomplish its ultimate purpose—to preserve 
human dignity.  
Justice Harry A. Blackmun’s jurisprudence has been marked 
by a similar insight. Judging is much more than a process of 
pristine deductive analysis. Compassion, wisdom, and common 
sense are as essential to the judicial role as scholarship and 
technical mastery of the law.3 Expressing this notion in his 
opinions, Justice Blackmun acknowledges the inevitable 
limitations of judges while also exposing the cruel reality of the 
law as a mathematical application of legal “axioms and 
corollaries” that “ignores the consideration of its impact on the 
lives of real people.”4 In his separate dissent in DeShaney v. 
                                                                                                             
 2. Arthur Dorbin, Why the Law Can't Do Without Compassion (Aug. 23, 
2011), http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/am-i-right/201108/why-the-law-
cant-do-without-compassion (last visited Apr. 10, 2015). 
 3. William H. Rehnquist, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, William J. Brennan, Jr., 
Byron R. White, Richard Arnold, A.M. Keith, Paul R. Baier, Allan Gates, Erwin 
N. Griswold, Edward Lazarus, Norval Morris, Gregg Orwoll, Estelle H. Rogers, 
Herman Schwartz, Nina Totenberg, & Sarah Weddington, A Tribute to Justice 
Harry A. Blackmun: “The Kind Voice of Friends.”, 43:3 AM. U.L. REV. 687-753 
(Spring 1994). 
 4. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881). 
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Winnebago County Department of Social Services,5 Justice 
Blackmun scolds the majority for purporting to be the 
dispassionate oracle of the law, unmoved by “natural sympathy.”6 
Justice Blackmun observes that the Court's precedents left 
questions unanswered and, in response, suggests a “sympathetic” 
reading of the Due Process Clause: “One which comports with 
dictates of fundamental justice and recognizes that compassion 
need not be exiled from the province of judging.” 7 
Same-gender marriage is a socially diversory topic, and the 
controversy surrounding it finds prominent expression in law, 
politics, and personal beliefs.8 The inextricable nature of same-
gender marriage encompasses matters of family structure, gender 
roles, justice, and equality. The Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, which resides at the forefront of the 
proponents’ arguments, guarantees that no person shall be deprived 
of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. The 
Supreme Court of the United States dedicates a considerable 
amount of time to itemizing specific liberties protected by this 
guarantee, including those related to marriage. Crucially, in Loving 
v. Virginia9 the Supreme Court held that states could not ban 
interracial marriage since “the freedom to marry has long been 
recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the 
orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.”10 To “deny this 
fundamental freedom on so unsupportable a basis as the racial 
classifications embodied in these statutes,” Chief Justice Earl 
Warren writes, is “directly subversive of the principle of equality 
                                                                                                             
 5. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 
212 (1989). (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 6. Id. at 212. 
 7. Id. at 213. 
 8. Justin Reinheimer, Same Sex Marriage Through the Equal Protection 
Clause: A Gender-Conscious Analysis, 21 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 213 
(2006). 
 9. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).  
 10. Id. at 13.  
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at the heart of the Fourteenth Amendment.”11 Thus, “under our 
Constitution, the freedom to marry, or not marry, a person of 
another race resides with the individual, and cannot be infringed by 
the State.”12 
Where political discourse surrounding same-gender marriage 
has become convoluted by religion and arguments of morality, the 
legal treatment of same-gender marriage under a sympathetic 
reading of the Due Process Clause holds the potential to provide a 
more direct path to the legalization of same-gender marriage.  
II. UNITED STATES V. WINDSOR: A LOVE STORY 
The Supreme Court’s 2013 decision in United States v. 
Windsor13 significantly altered the legal landscape for same-gender 
marriage in the United States.14 The Supreme Court held Section 3 
of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) unconstitutional as a 
violation of equal protection pursuant to the Due Process Clause of 
the Fifth Amendment. As a result of this landmark decision, 
marriages performed in those states recognizing same-gender 
marriages were to be treated equally for purposes of federal law.  
Windsor involves the individual, the institution, and competing 
points of view. From one point of view there is the individual 
plaintiff, Edith Windsor, and the love story of her same-gender 
marriage. From the other point of view, the case is about 
institutional power and the conflict between federal and state 
definitions of marriage. In a broader sense, the case is a reflection 
of the constant tension between the rights of the individual versus 
the “best interests” of the government, and the perpetual conflict 
regarding the division of political power between the state and the 
federal government. 
                                                                                                             
 11. Id. at 12. 
 12. Id. 
 13. United States v. Windsor, 133 S.Ct. 2675 (2013).  
 14. DOMA (Pub.L. 104–199, enacted Sep. 21, 1996) defines “marriage” as 
union between a man and a woman, and “spouse” to refer to a person of the 
opposite sex.  
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Thea Spyer and her surviving spouse, Edith Windsor, were 
married under Canadian law, a marriage recognized by the state of 
New York. After the death of Thea Spyer, Edith Windsor was 
denied the benefit of a spousal estate tax exemption under the 
DOMA. In bringing suit against the federal government for a 
refund of federal estate taxes paid, Edith Windsor challenged the 
constitutionality of DOMA. Although the Department of Justice 
refused to defend the statute, the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group 
(BLAG) intervened in the litigation to defend DOMA’s 
constitutionality. 
The complaint filed by Edith Windsor in the Southern District 
of New York focused on “Edie and Thea.”15 Edie and Thea’s love 
story spans four pages of the complaint, while a description of 
DOMA required only one page of the response. The story begins 
with the following excerpt: 
Edie and Thea’s life stories are in one sense remarkable for 
the extraordinary times through which they lived, and at the 
same time quite typical of the lives of gay men and lesbians 
of their generations given the pervasive discrimination and 
homophobia that Edie and Thea encountered on a routine 
basis. Yet despite obstacles nearly unimaginable today to 
the generations of gay men and lesbians who followed in 
their wake, Edie and Thea went on to live lives of great joy, 
full of dancing, love, and celebration.16 
When a protagonist like Edith Windsor drives the story of the 
opinion, the emotion invoked by her character becomes the 
impetus that energizes and commands the reader. Scholarship 
indicates that narratives “influence beliefs and attitudes by 
encouraging empathetic and emotional connections with story 
characters.”17 Having a character in the opinion allows the reader 
to distance himself from any existing preconceptions and to 
                                                                                                             
 15. Complaint at 2, Windsor v. U.S., 833 F.Supp.2d 394 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) 
(No. 1:10CV08435). 
 16. Complaint at 5, Windsor v. U.S., id. 
 17. Phillip J. Mazzocco & Melanie C. Green, Narrative Persuasion in Legal 
Settings: What’s the Story?, 23:1 THE JURY EXPERT (May 2011).  
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empathize with the narrative of the story. Identifiable characters 
facilitate the “receiver’s identification with and potential empathy 
for the characters” because the readers “vicariously experience 
characters’ beliefs and emotions, empathize with them, and 
become engrossed in the story.”18  
In discussing the Defense of Marriage Act, the Windsor Court 
continuously links the impact of the Federal statute to all persons, 
including Edie Windsor. In examining the relationship between the 
federal and state powers to define marriage, the Court explains that 
DOMA’s impact on the individual: “Diminishes the stability and 
predictability of the basic personal relations the State has found it 
proper to acknowledge and protect.”19 
Justice Kennedy writes, “The federal statute is invalid, for no 
legitimate purpose overcomes the effect to disparage and to injure 
those whom the State, by its marriage laws, sought to protect in 
personhood and dignity.”20 Writing for the majority, Justice 
Kennedy reasons: 
DOMA’s principal effect is to identify a subset of state-
sanctioned marriages and make them unequal. The 
principal purpose is to impose inequality, not for other 
reasons like governmental efficiency. . . Responsibilities, as 
well as rights, enhance the dignity and integrity of the 
person.... By this dynamic, DOMA undermines both the 
public and private significance of state-sanctioned same-
gender marriages; for it tells those couples, and all the 
world, that their otherwise valid marriages are unworthy of 
federal recognition . . . .21  
When the federal government treats heterosexual marriages 
differently than those state-sanctioned same-gender marriages, the 
court holds that the Constitution prevents the distinction. “Such a 
                                                                                                             
 18. Min Kyung Lee, Story of Birth and Funeral: Rhetorical Analysis of 
Windsor and Shelby County, Columbia Public Law Research Paper No. 14-372 
(February 2014), available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2393634. 
 19. United States v. Windsor, 133 S.Ct. 2675, 2720 (2013). 
 20. Id. at 2696.  
 21. Id. at 2681. 
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differentiation,” Justice Kennedy exclaims, “demean[s] the couple, 
whose moral and sexual choices the Constitution protects.”22  
Though the word “dignity” cannot be found in the language of 
the Constitution, Justice Kennedy uses it no fewer than ten times in 
his majority opinion. Justice Kennedy emphasizes human dignity 
as a constitutional value; one that stands at the heart of the Court’s 
longstanding commitment to equal protection. In refusing to 
engage in a solely methodical and dispassionate analysis, the Court 
situates itself to deliver an opinion that contemplates human 
dignity, compassion, and the impact on the lives of very real 
people, including those children affected by the decision. 
“DOMA,” Justice Kennedy writes, “humiliates tens of 
thousands of children now being raised by same-gender couples. 
The law in question makes it even more difficult for the children to 
understand the integrity and closeness of their own family and the 
concords of daily life.”23 Justice Kennedy describes the anticipated 
harms of DOMA, beyond those financial consequences, and 
contemplates a clear identification of the victims of the Defense of 
Marriage Act and their suffering. In rendering an opinion that takes 
cognizance of these consequences, arguably, Justice Kennedy 
recognizes that the right to same-gender marriage is implicit in the 
Constitution. Nevertheless, underlying tones of federalism in the 
opinion have caused some confusion in lower courts.  
III. MUDDLING IN LOUISIANA 
A. Robicheaux v. Caldwell: Abandoning the “Pageant of 
Empathy” 
The same-gender marriage situation in Louisiana has now 
become somewhat muddled, among recent conflicting rulings by 
different courts—one federal, one state. Judge Martin Leach-Cross 
Feldman of the Eastern District of Louisiana was the first federal 
                                                                                                             
 22. Id. at 2675.  
 23. Id. at 2694. 
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judge to uphold a state prohibition against same-gender marriage 
since the landmark decision striking down the Defense of Marriage 
Act in Windsor.24  
The petitioners in Robicheaux v. Caldwell25 include seven 
Louisiana same-gender couples, several of whom are raising 
children, and the Forum For Equality, a statewide organization 
whose members include Louisiana same-gender couples and their 
families. The petitioners allege that Louisiana’s constitutional ban 
on same-gender marriage forbids them access to the status, rights, 
and protections of marriage; disparages their families; and inflicts 
harms on their children. Such a ban, they argue, denies petitioners 
who are unmarried the right to marry within the state and denies 
petitioners who have legally married outside of the state all legal 
recognition of their marriages. The descriptions of each petitioner 
are limited to, at most, four to five lines of the complaint. In brief, 
they argue that Louisiana’s marriage ban infringes upon their 
constitutional right to due process and equal protection and, 
accordingly, that the ban should be struck down.  
While most federal judges responsible for striking down same-
gender marriage prohibitions incorporate arguments of love, 
equality, empathy, and compassion into their opinions, Judge 
Feldman’s opinion provides an unadulterated contrast. In 
upholding Louisiana’s prohibition on same-gender marriage, Judge 
Feldman concludes that same-gender couples have no 
“fundamental right to marry” and that Louisiana’s Constitutional 
amendment26 should be judged by the lowest standard of judicial 
scrutiny, rational basis.27  
In his nearly thirty-two page opinion, Judge Feldman exiles 
compassion from his judgment and fails to employ a sympathetic 
reading of the Due Process Clause, as advocated by Justice Harry 
                                                                                                             
 24. Robicheaux v. Caldwell, 2 F. Supp. 3d 910 (E.D. La. 2014). 
 25. Id. 
 26. La. Const. Art. XII, § 15. 
 27. Robicheaux v. Caldwell, supra note 24.  
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A. Blackmun. Judge Feldman dispassionately argues that being 
homosexual is a choice, compares same-gender marriage to incest 
and polygamy, and, most offensively, labels same-gender marriage 
as “inconceivable.”28 “No authority dictates,” Feldman writes, 
“that same-gender marriage is anchored to history or tradition. The 
concept of same-gender marriage is ‘a new perspective, a new 
insight,’ nonexistent and even inconceivable until very recently 
....”29 Despite the fact that the majority of federal courts are 
currently striking down same-gender marriage bans, Judge 
Feldman explicitly disagrees. “The federal court decisions,” 
Feldman wrote “thus far exemplify a pageant of empathy; 
decisions impelled by a response of innate pathos . . . . It would no 
doubt be celebrated to be in the company of the near-unanimity of 
the many other federal courts that have spoken to this pressing 
issue, if this court were confident in the belief that those cases 
provide a correct guide.”30 
Judge Feldman’s opinion goes beyond that of legal analysis 
and delivers a demoralizing and personal insult to marriage 
equality proponents. In invoking his “moral slippery slope” 
argument, Judge Feldman implies that expanding the definition of 
marriage to include same-gender couples might “open the door” to 
the legalization of incest and polygamy—two behaviors explicitly 
prohibited by existing law. In proffering the following questions, 
Judge Feldman grossly mischaracterizes same-gender marriage and 
implies that such a right is distinct and inferior to the fundamental 
right of marriage enjoyed by heterosexual couples:  
Must the states permit or recognize a marriage between an 
aunt and niece? Aunt and nephew? Brother/brother? Father 
and child? May minors marry? Must marriage be limited to 
only two people? . . . Such unions would undeniably be 
equally committed to love and caring for one another, just 
                                                                                                             
 28. Id. at 926. 
 29. Id. at 923 (citing Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2689) (emphasis added). 
 30. Id. at 925. 
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like the plaintiffs.31  
At no point in Loving v. Virginia,32 however, did the Supreme 
Court engage in such an attenuated, impertinent analysis of 
whether allowing interracial couples the right to marry would lead 
to such obscure consequences, notwithstanding the illegality of 
interracial sexual relations at that time in history. In Lawrence v. 
Texas, Justice Kennedy indicated that private, consensual sexual 
intimacy between two adult persons of the same gender may not be 
punished by the State, and it can form “but one element in a 
personal bond that is more enduring.”33  
Misapplying the language of the majority in Windsor, Judge 
Feldman relies upon the first portion of Justice Kennedy’s opinion 
that speaks to the states’ power to define marriage.34 The States’ 
interest in defining and regulating the marital relation, subject to 
constitutional guarantees, proceeds from the understanding that 
marriage is more than a routine classification for purposes of 
certain statutory benefits. Relying on Windsor as a shield, Judge 
Feldman writes: 
This court finds it difficult to minimize, indeed, ignore, the 
high court’s powerful reminder in Windsor: ‘The definition 
of marriage is the foundation of the State’s broader 
authority to regulate the subject of domestic relations with 
respect to the protection of offspring, property interests, 
and the enforcement of marital responsibilities . . . The 
whole subject of the domestic relations of husband and 
wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws of the States and 
not to the laws of the United States.35 
Judge Feldman blatantly takes portions of the Windsor decision 
out of context and errs in disregarding the second portion of Justice 
Kennedy’s opinion, which reiterates that state laws must respect 
                                                                                                             
 31. Id. at 926. 
 32. 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 33. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U. S. 558, 567 (2003). 
 34. United States v. Windsor, 133 S.Ct. 2675, 2692 (2013). 
 35. Robicheaux v. Caldwell, supra note 24, at 918 (citing In re Burrus, 136 
U.S. 586, 593). 
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the constitutional rights of persons, and that same-gender marriage 
bans offend the basic principles of equality.  
Greatly persuaded by the argument that same-gender marriage 
should be a product of the democratic process, Judge Feldman 
lends legitimacy to the disposition of social issues by prevailing 
popular opinion and agrees that, “fundamental social change . . . is 
better cultivated through democratic consensus.”36  
Relying upon a dissenting opinion from the Tenth Circuit 
Court of Appeals, Judge Feldman invokes the words of Judge Paul 
J. Kelley which, he claims, “ought not be slighted”:  
[W]here, as here, the language of the applicable provision 
provides great leeway and where the underlying social 
policies are felt to be of vital importance, the temptation to 
read personal preference into the Constitution is 
understandably great . . . . But it is not the business of this 
Court to pronounce policy. It must observe a fastidious 
regard for limitations on its own power, and this precludes 
the Court’s giving effect to its own notions of what is wise 
or politic.37 
Classical legal scholar John Chipman Gray would argue, 
instead, that the limits of jurisprudence include not only subject 
matter, but also a consideration what the law should be. “The 
opinions of judges on matters of ethics and policy,” Gray argues, 
“are the ‘chief engines’ of legal development.”38 Thus, emotion is 
and ought to be understood as part of the legal process, and not as 
merely a “personal preference.” In accepting a judge’s use of 
discretion we must understand who the judge is. This 
understanding includes his sociological, political, ideological, and 
psychological aspects; none of which can be thought of 
independently of emotion.39 In the case of same-gender marriage, 
                                                                                                             
 36. Id. at 918. 
 37. Id. at 926 (citing Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193 (2014)).  
 38. Stephen A. Siegel, John Chipman Gray and the Moral Basis of 
Classical Legal Thought, 88:5 IOWA L. REV. (August 2001). 
 39. RENATA GROSSI, LOOKING FOR LOVE IN THE LEGAL DISCOURSE OF 
MARRIAGE 4-5 (ANU Press 2014).  
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however, love is a human experience, not a political statement for 
which Judge Feldman’s own notion is required.  
Beyond Judge Martin Feldman’s exile of empathy from 
judgment lies another aspect of the case that, arguably, contributes 
to its adverse outcome. Like the same-gender cases that preceded 
it, the plaintiffs in Robicheaux are several. While it is true that the 
consolidation of cases may act as a mechanism for legal 
expediency, it does so to the detriment of the parties. The result is 
a dilution of the personal narrative. The personal stories of the 
plaintiffs, which are critical in invoking empathy and compassion, 
become lost amongst the legal argument. As a result, the narrative 
is uneven and judges like Martin Feldman, then, are less likely to 
empathize with a seemingly unidentifiable main character. Because 
the interests at stake are so closely tied to the personal lives of each 
character affected, it is imperative that marriage equality 
proponents place the story of the individual at the forefront of their 
arguments.  
B. Costanza v. Caldwell: The Intact, Same-Gender Family 
In a Louisiana state court action, Costanza v. Caldwell 
(2014),40 Judge Edward Rubin of the Fifteenth Judicial District 
Court overturned Louisiana’s ban on same-gender marriage in 
declaring the law unconstitutional as a violation of the Due Process 
and Equal Protection Clauses of Fourteenth Amendment, as well as 
the Full Faith and Credit Clause. Judge Rubin ordered state 
officials to recognize the marriage of a lesbian couple, Angela 
Costanza and Chastity Brewer; to officially approve their adoption 
of a boy, N.B., born in 2004; and to allow the couple to file a joint 
state income tax return.  
The case involves a same-gender couple (Costanza and 
Brewer) married in California in 2008, who petitioned the state of 
                                                                                                             
 40. Costanza v. Caldwell, No. 2013-0052 D2. (LA 15th JDC, Sept. 22, 
2014). 
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Louisiana to have their marriage recognized and to allow Mrs. 
Costanza to adopt the biological child of Mrs. Brewer through an 
intra-family adoption. In denying their request, the State notes that 
same-gender marriage is expressly prohibited under Louisiana 
law.41 In their petition, Costanza and Brewer argue that by 
forbidding same-gender couples to marry and adopt, the state of 
Louisiana violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment because such a prohibition denies same-gender 
couples those rights afforded to similarly-situated heterosexual 
couples. The petitioners also argue that Louisiana’s failure to 
recognize their marriage and its refusal to grant the intra-family 
adoption of their ten-year old son, N.B., deprives them of their 
fundamental right to marry and raise their child in violation of the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  
Judge Rubin in Costanza, like Justice Kennedy in Windsor, 
utilizes the symbolic meaning of children in creating the personal 
narrative and crafting a persuasive argument. The three means of 
effecting persuasion, according to Aristotle, are to understand 
emotions, to name them and describe them, and to know their 
causes and the way in which they are excited.42 If the reader is 
sympathetic to those negatively affected by Louisiana’s ban on 
same-gender marriage, such as young N.B., they are generally 
more agreeable to the court’s determination of the ban as 
unconstitutional. Moral emotions, including sympathy, are highly 
correlated and related to vulnerability. In the case of same-gender 
marriage, the most readily identifiable and vulnerable victims are 
the children. 
Contradicting Judge Feldman, Judge Rubin dismisses the 
state’s proposition that the ban on same-gender marriage has a 
rational relationship to its goals of linking children with their 
biological parents. In evidencing that Louisiana allows adoptions 
by foster parents, Judge Rubin reasons that it would be “illogical” 
                                                                                                             
 41. LA. CONST. art. XII, § 15. 
 42. ARISTOTLE, ON RHETORIC, BOOK 1, at 8. 
256 JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES [Vol. 8 
 
 
 
to say that intact families are only those formed by a child's 
biological parents. “There can be no distinction between linking 
children to ‘intact families,’ formed by their biological parents and 
linking children to already intact families43 involving same-gender 
marriages, such as the Costanza-Brewer family.”44 Finding that the 
petitioners are best positioned to make familial decisions regarding 
the custody and care of their young child, N.B., Judge Rubin 
declares that the result of holding otherwise would constitute an 
infringement upon Chastity and Angela’s liberty interest in raising 
their child, as guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.45 In his last remarks relating to the 
adoption of young N.B., Judge Rubin explains that while the 
children of same-gender couples may only have biological ties to 
one parent, “Biological relationships are not the exclusive 
determinant of the existence of a family.”46 
In addition to possessing the requisite legal expertise, Judge 
Rubin displays a compassionate recognition of how legal decisions 
impact the lives of ordinary people, particularly those involved in 
same-gender marriages. While the last eight pages of the opinion 
contain a mechanical recitation of the relied upon jurisprudence, 
Judge Rubin devotes a considerable portion of the opinion to 
affirming that the right sought by same-gender couples is not a 
new right, but merely the fundamental right to marry that is 
similarly enjoyed by heterosexual couples. In contrast, by denying 
the applicability of Loving v. Virginia47 to Robicheaux, Judge 
Feldman scornfully treats the notion of same-gender marriage as 
                                                                                                             
 43. In his reasons for opinion, Judge Edward Rubin chooses to include 
parentheticals around “intact family” when it precedes a description of a hetero-
normative family. When describing a family structure, whose composure is that 
of a same-gender couple, the words “intact family” are not surrounded by 
parentheticals. It would appear, here, that Judge Rubin’s grammar choice is 
purposeful; highlighting that the scope of intact families includes both hetero 
and homosexual couples.  
 44. Costanza v. Caldwell, supra note 40, at 18. 
 45. Id. at 19. 
 46. Id.  
 47. Id.  
2015] AN ANALYSIS IN EMPATHY 257 
 
 
 
“inconceivable,” non-traditional, and secondary to the fundamental 
right of marriage afforded to heterosexual couples—depriving 
those same-gender couples of their dignity. By comparison, relying 
upon the majority opinion in Kitchen,48 Judge Rubin explains that 
the relevant question presented in Loving49 is not whether 
interracial marriage is deeply rooted in tradition, or whether 
interracial marriage is implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. 
Rather, he submits that the relevant right at issue in Loving is “the 
freedom to marry.”50 
Judge Rubin’s empathetic opinion recognizes that although the 
right to same-gender marriage is not deeply rooted in tradition, a 
history of discrimination against homosexuals is ever present:  
Lest we forget, there was a time in America’s history when 
gays and lesbians were not permitted to even associate in 
public….We are past that now, but when it comes to 
marriage between persons of the same sex, this nation is 
moving towards acceptance that years ago would have 
never been contemplated.51 
Compassion in the province of judging becomes increasingly 
important to address the issues of stigma and discriminatory 
attitudes:  
There are those that might argue that gays and lesbians can 
be treated differently, and yet be considered to be equal 
among the rest of Americans. [B]ut . . . fortunately for this 
country, the U.S. Supreme Court was presented with the 
case of Brown v. Board of Education,52 which overruled 
                                                                                                             
 48. Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. June 25, 2014). In 2013, 
three same-gender couples (Derek Kitchen and Moudi Sbeity, Karen Archer and 
Kate Call, and Laurie Wood and Kody Partridge) filed suit challenging Utah’s 
ban on same-gender marriage. The U.S. District court held that the ban was 
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 49. Id.  
 50. Costanza v. Caldwell, supra note 40, at 21. 
 51. Id. at 20. 
 52. Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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any doctrine of ‘separate but equal.’53  
In comparing Brown v. Board of Education to Costanza v. 
Caldwell, Judge Rubin brilliantly links the deprivation of equal 
protection experienced by homosexual couples to the same 
deprivations of dignity experienced by racial minorities during the 
civil rights era; a moral evil deeply rooted in our nation’s history.  
Judge Rubin likewise dismisses the notion, relied upon by 
Judge Feldman, that widespread democratic consensus is required 
before adopting such social change. Notwithstanding the approval 
of Louisiana voters to ban same-gender marriages and civil unions 
in 2004,54 “It is the opinion of this court that widespread social 
consensus leading to acceptance of same-gender marriage is 
already in progress. The moral disapproval of same-gender 
marriage is not the same as it was when Louisiana first defined 
marriage as a union between one man and a woman.”55 Further, 
and more importantly, public consensus does not guarantee that 
public policy comports with the rights guaranteed by the United 
States Constitution. 
IV. BASKIN V. BOGAN: SARDONICISM IN THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT 
Writing for a unanimous three-judge panel, in Baskin v. Bogan 
(2014),56 Judge Richard Posner of the Seventh Circuit rendered an 
opinion providing that Wisconsin and Indiana have “no reasonable 
basis” for forbidding same-gender marriage.57 In Judge Posner’s 
opinion, there is no question that homosexuals constitute a suspect 
class of persons. Tantamount to the line of reasoning employed by 
Judge Rubin, same-gender couples constitute a group of persons 
with an immutable characteristic who have historically faced 
discrimination. “It was tradition to not allow blacks and whites to 
                                                                                                             
 53. Costanza v. Caldwell, supra note 40, at 19. 
 54. La. Const. Art. XII, § 15. 
 55. Costanza v. Caldwell, supra note 40, at 19. 
 56. Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648 (7th Cir. 2014). 
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marry—a tradition that got swept away,” Posner says. “Prohibition 
of same-gender marriage is [rooted in] a tradition of hate ... and 
savage discrimination.”58 
To achieve a ruling that firmly provides for marriage equality, 
Judge Posner recognizes that federal judges in other circuits may 
have revised the constitutional framework for marriage by either 
requiring heightened judicial scrutiny or declaring same-gender 
marriage a fundamental right. Posner, however, is not interested in 
reformulating the constitutional framework. Rather, he seeks to 
emphasize the constitutionally offensive nature of the state 
statutes. In doing so, he underscores that such statutes offend the 
Constitution under any interpretation of the equal protection 
clause, regardless of the level of judicial scrutiny.  
Although unnecessary, Judge Posner performs a review of “the 
leading scientific theories” about homosexuality to illustrate that 
being homosexual is not a choice, an opinion held by notable 
jurists, including Justice Antonin Scalia and Judge Martin 
Feldman.59 The review, however, reinforces Posner’s analytical 
framework that a suspect class may not be constitutionally 
disadvantaged without a rational basis. Even at such a low 
threshold, he condemns the viability of prohibitions against same-
gender marriage. 
During oral arguments in Baskin v. Bogan,60 the recurring 
theme of the state’s arguments included “responsible procreation.” 
In summarizing and dismissing the states’ arguments, Judge 
Posner exclaims:  
[The] government thinks that straight couples tend to be 
sexually irresponsible, producing unwanted children by the 
carload, and so must be pressured (in the form of 
government encouragement of marriage through a 
combination of sticks and carrots) to marry, but that gay 
couples, unable as they are to produce children wanted or 
                                                                                                             
 58. Oral Argument, Judge Posner, Baskin v. Bogan, id. 
 59. Baskin v. Bogan, supra note 56, at 657. 
 60. Id. at 648. 
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unwanted, are model parents—model citizens really—so 
have no need for marriage.61 
“Heterosexuals,” Judge Posner responds, “get drunk and 
pregnant, producing unwanted children; their reward is to be 
allowed to marry. Homosexual couples do not produce unwanted 
children; their reward is to be denied the right to marry. Go 
figure.”62 
Despite the entertaining and amusing juxtaposition of Judge 
Posner’s opinion, in more serious terms, Posner describes the case 
as being one “at a deeper level,” about “the welfare of American 
children.” The mere fact that gay couples in America are raising 
more than hundred thousand children suggests a compelling 
interest in support of gay marriage, since actively banning it, 
demonstrably harms children. During oral arguments, Judge 
Posner frequently interrupts Indiana Solicitor General Thomas 
Fischer, just moments into his presentation to outline a number of 
psychological strains endured by the children of unmarried 
couples, including the struggle to understand “[W]hy their 
schoolmates’ parents are married, yet theirs are [not].”63 “What 
horrible stuff,” Posner says.64 In describing the harmful effects on 
children, Posner comprehensively contributes to the vivid imagery 
of their victimization. 
Assuming that same-gender couples constitute a suspect class, 
Judge Posner recognizes that a law that harms such a class may be 
constitutional if it has offsetting benefits. Judge Posner, 
recognizing this possibility, then asks what group of persons could 
possibly benefit from a ban on same-gender marriage. Quoting 
John Stuart Mill, Posner writes,  
To be the basis of legal or moral concern . . . the harm must 
be tangible, secular, material—physical or financial, or, if 
emotional, focused and direct—rather than moral or 
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spiritual. . . . [W]hile many heterosexuals (though in 
America a rapidly diminishing number) disapprove of 
same-gender marriage, there is no way they are going to be 
hurt by it in a way that the law would take cognizance of. 
Wisconsin doesn’t argue otherwise. Many people strongly 
disapproved of interracial marriage, and, more to the point, 
many people strongly disapproved (and still strongly 
disapprove) of homosexual sex, yet Loving v. Virginia65 
invalidated state laws banning interracial marriage, and 
Lawrence v. Texas66 invalidated state laws banning 
homosexual sex acts.67  
“There is simply no harm,” Posner writes, “tangible, secular, 
material—physical or financial, or … focused and direct done to 
anybody by permitting gay marriage. Conservative Christians may 
be offended, but there is no way they are going to be hurt by it in a 
way that the law would take cognizance of.” A lot of people, after 
all, objected to interracial marriage in 1967—but that didn’t stop 
the court from invalidating anti-miscegenation laws in Loving v. 
Virginia.68 
In his opinion, Judge Posner makes his points with sardonic 
humor, but he emphasizes the profound harm that marriage bans 
inflict on same-gender couples and their families. In humanizing 
the parties central to his opinion, Judge Posner “restores the equal 
protection clause to its rightful place as the safeguard for all whom 
the state seeks to harm unjustly.”69 In the words of Mark Joseph 
Stern, a constitutional law blogger for Slate Magazine: 
Posner does not sound like a man aiming to have his words 
etched in the history books or praised by future generations. 
Rather, he sounds like a man who has listened to all the 
arguments against gay marriage, analyzed them cautiously 
and thoroughly, and found himself absolutely disgusted by 
                                                                                                             
 65. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 66. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003). 
 67. Baskin v. Bogan, supra note 56, at 670. 
 68. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 69. Mark Joseph Stern, Judge Posner’s Gay Marriage Opinion Is a Witty, 
Deeply Moral Masterpiece (Sept. 5, 2014), http://www.slate.com/blogs/ 
outward/2014/09/05/judge_richard_posner_s_gay_marriage_opinion_is_witty_
moral_and_brilliant.html. 
262 JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES [Vol. 8 
 
 
 
their sophistry and rank bigotry. The opinion is a 
masterpiece of wit and logic that doesn’t call attention to—
indeed, doesn’t seem to care about—its own brilliance. 
Posner is not writing for Justice Anthony Kennedy, or for 
judges of the future, or even for gay people of the present. 
He is writing, very clearly, for himself.70  
V. CONCLUSION 
Human sympathy and compassion are vital in the work of the 
Court. Justice Harry A. Blackmun’s vision focuses upon human 
details and on the problems, worries, and predicaments of 
individuals. This has been the hallmark of his vision of 
constitutional law and his interaction with the world around him.71 
This practical yet compassionate view adds to the scope of the 
Court’s work and its angle of vision. Where political discourse 
surrounding same-gender marriage has become muddled by 
religion, morality, public policy, and personal prejudice, the legal 
treatment of same-gender marriage under a sympathetic reading of 
the Due Process Clause holds the potential to provide a more direct 
path to the legalization of same-gender marriage. We must never 
forget, “Compassion need not be exiled from the province of 
judging.”72 
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